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Background. Major depressive disorder (MDD) is associated with abnormalities in ﬁnancial reward processing.
Previous research suggests that patients with MDD show reduced sensitivity to frequency of ﬁnancial rewards.
However, there is a lack of conclusive evidence from studies investigating the evaluation of ﬁnancial rewards over
time, an important aspect of reward processing that inﬂuences the way people plan long-term investments. Beck’s cog-
nitive model posits that patients with MDD hold a negative view of the future that may inﬂuence the amount of
resources patients are willing to invest into their future selves.
Method. We administered a delay discounting task to 82 participants: 29 healthy controls, 29 unmedicated participants
with fully remitted MDD (rMDD) and 24 participants with current MDD (11 on medication).
Results. Patients with current MDD, relative to remitted patients and healthy subjects, discounted large-sized future
rewards at a signiﬁcantly higher rate and were insensitive to changes in reward size from medium to large. There
was a main effect of clinical group on discounting rates for large-sized rewards, and discounting rates for large-sized
rewards correlated with severity of depressive symptoms, particularly hopelessness.
Conclusions. Higher discounting of delayed rewards in MDD seems to be state dependent and may be a reﬂection of
depressive symptoms, speciﬁcally hopelessness. Discounting distant rewards at a higher rate means that patients are
more likely to choose immediate ﬁnancial options. Such impairments related to long-term investment planning may
be important for understanding value-based decision making in MDD, and contribute to ongoing functional impairment.
Received 18 April 2013; Revised 10 September 2013; Accepted 18 September 2013; First published online 1 November 2013
Key words: Delay discounting, hopelessness, major depressive disorder, reward processing.
Introduction
Major depressive disorder (MDD) has been associated
with reward processing impairments. Abnormal re-
ward processing may also play a role in impaired occu-
pational functioning, which has been identiﬁed as a
crucial factor in the high economic costs of the disorder
(Beddington et al. 2008). Hopelessness, a bleak outlook
into the future and suicidal ideation are among symp-
toms of MDD (APA, 2000), and these symptoms may
interfere with decisions requiring long-term economi-
cal investment planning. Temporal (delay) discounting
may serve as an effective experimental probe of this be-
haviour. Tesch & Sanfey (2008) deﬁned delay discount-
ing as a fundamental dimension of ﬁnancial decision
making by which people choose between short-term
gain maximization and long-term equity, depending
on subjective valuation of money over time. They sug-
gested that one of the key factors in determining trends
in these ﬁnancial decisions is individuals’ preferences
for having immediate rewards and delayed costs.
Previous reward processing research mostly made
use of signal detection paradigms and investigated
the relationship between monetary reward processing
and anhedonia (inability to gain pleasure from activi-
ties that were previously enjoyed), which is one of
the core symptoms of MDD (APA, 2000; Pizzagalli
et al. 2005). These studies showed impaired response
biases to monetary rewards in dysphoric individuals
(Henriques et al. 1994; Juhasz et al. 2009), in individuals
undergoing an experimental stress induction (Bogdan
& Pizzagalli, 2006), and in people fulﬁlling clinical cri-
teria for MDD (Pizzagalli et al. 2008). Time is an im-
portant variable in reward processing models. Signal
detection paradigms manipulate the probability and
frequency of winning monetary rewards, while keep-
ing the reward size ﬁxed across different conditions,
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but cannot address the impact of MDD on subjective
valuation of different magnitudes of monetary rewards
over time (i.e. delay discounting behaviour).
Delay discounting behaviour is typically assessed
using monetary choice tasks that have been most fre-
quently used to assess impulsive tendencies in people
with various addictions (Kirby et al. 1999; Kirby &
Petry, 2004; Bornovalova et al. 2005; Lawyer, 2008).
However, discounting behaviour tends to correlate
poorly with self-rated impulsivity on established per-
sonality scales in non-addicted populations (McLeish
& Oxoby, 2007) and even seems limited to certain sub-
types of impulsive behaviour in individuals with
heroin addiction (Kirby et al. 1999).
From an economical perspective, delay discounting
can also be used simply to deﬁne the degree to
which individuals prefer short-term over long-time
economical strategies (Read & Read, 2004). Previous
discounting studies suggested that these individual
preferences are inﬂuenced by both biological and en-
vironmental factors. In healthy subjects, discounting
rates change over the lifespan, which may reﬂect
neuroanatomical changes and/or changes in environ-
mental factors (Read & Read, 2004; Whelan &
McHugh, 2009). Environmental uncertainty imposed
by external conditions also inﬂuences discounting
rates. Individuals tend to prefer short-term rewards
when they are traumatized by environmental condi-
tions, such as the Wenchuan earthquake (Li et al.
2012), or ﬁnancial deprivation (Chao et al. 2009).
Under such conditions, where there is considerable un-
certainty about the future, steeper discounting may be
driven by a realistic evaluation of one’s life circum-
stances rather than impulsivity.
As stated previously, MDD is characterized by anhe-
donia and hopelessness about the future as well as the
present (Beck, 2005). It is possible that, because MDD
is associated with a bleak future outlook and hopeless-
ness, individuals may be expected to shift towards
short-term economical decision-making strategies
(i.e. higher discounting rates). We predict that these de-
pressive symptoms will exert a signiﬁcant effect
particularly in evaluating rewards that are presented
with the furthest delays. Existing studies have explored
this hypothesis in mixed populations with bipolar and
also with unipolar depression (Takahashi et al. 2008),
showing lower discounting rates for the distant future
but higher discounting rates for the near future in
patients. A study in patients with late-life depression
(Dombrovski et al. 2011) showed that lower discount-
ing rates for delayed rewards are associated with
high-lethality suicide attempts whereas low-lethality
suicide attempters had higher discounting rates
relative to both non-suicidal patients and healthy sub-
jects. Healthy individuals with higher self-reported
anhedonia (Lempert & Pizzagalli, 2010) or with exper-
imentally reduced serotonin (one of the key neuro-
transmitters involved in MDD) (Schweighofer et al.
2008) have lower discounting rates for delayed
rewards. Whether short-term experimental manipula-
tions of serotonin is a good model for depression
phenomenology is always debatable; in the context of
the long-term projections involved in temporal dis-
counting, the model may be particularly unsuitable.
The two previous clinical studies (Takahashi et al.
2008; Dombrovski et al. 2011) showed a complex pat-
tern of temporal discounting in depression dependent
on both delay and patient characteristics. Therefore,
we consider that temporal discounting warrants
further investigation in a population of young to
middle-aged adults with unipolar depression (current
and remitted).
From the behavioural–economical perspective we
presented earlier, we predicted that patients with cur-
rent MDD would have higher discounting rates for
delayed rewards (i.e. choosing the immediate reward
option), particularly inﬂuenced by hopelessness
about the future, which would make them less likely
to invest into their future selves. The study of Dom-
brovski et al. (2011) showed that non-suicidal de-
pressed individuals and suicidal ideators, and also
low-lethality suicide attempters, tended to have higher
discounting rates than non-depressed controls, and
therefore it seems reasonable to predict higher dis-
counting rates in our cohort.
We therefore sought to investigate delay discounting
in patients with current unipolar MDD. Furthermore,
we investigated whether delay discounting abnormali-
ties may represent a state feature of depression.
Recent evidence suggests that even patients with re-
mitted MDD (rMDD) may show some abnormalities
in emotional and reward processing (Eshel & Roiser,
2010; Green et al. 2013). However, if (as hypothesized)
impaired discounting reﬂects symptoms, particularly
hopelessness, abnormalities in MDD should normalize
as symptoms remit. We therefore recruited patients
with current and remitted MDD and healthy subjects,
to test the predictions that patients with MDD will
have a higher discounting rate for future rewards in
long delays and that this behavioural tendency will
not be seen in a group with fully remitted symptoms.
Method
Participants
The study obtained ethical approval from the North
West/Manchester South National Health Service
(NHS) Research Ethics Committee. Participants were
recruited using online and print advertisements.
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Initial suitability was assessed with a telephone pre-
screening interview and the use of an online survey.
Written informed consent was obtained from all
participants.
Inclusion/exclusion criteria
Patients with MDD fulﬁlled criteria for a current major
depressive episode (MDE) according to DSM-IV-TR
(APA, 2000). The clinical interviews were conducted
by trained researchers. We excluded people with cur-
rent or history of substance use disorders, psychotic
disorders, clinically signiﬁcant levels of suicide risk
[in the acute phase of a previous attempt and scores
55 on the Montgomery–Asberg Depression Rating
Scale (MADRS) item 10], bipolar depression, and any
other Axis I anxiety disorders as the likely cause of
the current MDE and any other neurological disorders
in the MDD group. Participants in the rMDD group
fulﬁlled criteria for a past DSM-IV-TR MDE. Ex-
clusion criteria for the rMDD group were similar
but included currently meeting diagnostic criteria for
MDD or taking psychotropic medication. The healthy
control group had no current or past Axis I disorders.
In total, 29 healthy control participants, 29 indivi-
duals with rMDD and 24 patients with current MDD
(11 with medication; see online Supplementary
Tables S1 and S2 for information on clinical groups)
were included in the ﬁnal analysis. One patient
(male, aged 43 years, non-medicated) with current
MDD was excluded on the basis of current hypomanic
symptoms that were not present at the time of the tele-
phone screening interview.
Materials and procedures
Clinical interview procedure
Participants were invited for a clinical interview in
which trained researchers (E.P., P.D.T. and E.J.T.)
conducted the Mood Disorders Module A and the
psychotic screening of the Structured Clinical Inter-
view for DSM-IV-TR (SCID; First et al. 2002). The
Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI;
Sheehan et al. 1998) was conducted with all the partici-
pants and relevant SCID modules were used to make a
full assessment. The MADRS, the Global Assessment
of Functioning (GAF) scale (Axis V, DSM-IV) and the
Social and Occupational Functionality Assessment
Scale (SOFAS; only for patients with MDD) (Axis V,
DSM-IV) were used.
The monetary choice task
The monetary choice task was based on Kirby et al.
(1999) and contained 27 items asking participants to
choose between two monetary offers: one available
today and a larger one available at a delay (see
Table 1 for examples). In this task, the delays varied be-
tween 7 and 186 days and rewards varied between £11
and £85 (the range comprising all immediate and
delayed rewards). We followed Kirby et al.’s classiﬁca-
tion of rewards into three categories (small, medium
and large) but converted the original task into UK cur-
rency (GBP; £). Following the methodology of Kirby
et al. (1999) for delayed rewards (always larger than
immediate rewards), small rewards were from £25 to
£35, medium rewards were from £50 to £60, and
large rewards were from £75 to £85. The immediate
rewards varied between £11 and £80, always being
smaller in magnitude than the delayed reward size in
each temporal discounting proposal. We used a com-
puterized version of this task. The monetary choices
were presented in the same order as they were pre-
sented in Kirby et al. (1999). Before starting the task,
participants were asked to read the instructions on
the computer screen and any questions were clariﬁed.
Participants completed this task in a quiet room desig-
nated for testing purposes. The participants’ choices on
the task did not affect the amount of reimbursement
they received for participation; we used a hypothetical
version of the task.
Data analysis
The k coefﬁcient, which designates the discounting
rate for delayed reward at any indifference point
(i.e. the point in which participants do not discriminate
between immediate and delayed rewards within
any reward size category), was calculated using equa-
tion (1):
k = [(A/V) − 1]/D, (1)
where A is the amount of the delayed reward, V is the
subjective value of the delayed reward and D is the
length of delay. Established indifference points for dif-
ferent rewards are plotted on a graph to establish a
discounting curve for any individual. Previous re-
search shows that hyperbolic equations explain the dis-
counting data better than alternative exponential
equations that make the assumption that the rate of
discounting remains constant over time (Mazur, 1987;
Murphy et al. 2001; Myerson et al. 2001; Green &
Myerson, 2004). The hyperbolic discount function is
obtained as:
F(D)hyperbolic = 1/(1+ kD). (2)
Individual discounting coefﬁcients (k) for small, me-
dium and large rewards, along with their geometric
means as a separate score, were computed in
Microsoft Ofﬁce Excel. Descriptive and between-group
analyses were conducted with SPSS version 20.0 (SPSS
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Inc., USA). We used a general linear model (GLM) to
explore any interaction between clinical status and
temporal discounting at different rewards sizes. To in-
vestigate the appropriateness of this model for the
data, we undertook investigations of the model
assumptions using residual plots (Neter et al. 1996,
pp. 778–781). Both the normal quantile–quantile plot
of the model residuals and the plot of the residuals
against the ﬁtted values of the model indicated that
the errors were not satisfactorily normally distributed,
and that the variance was not equal across all groups.
To successfully transform the data so that these
assumptions were better met, we used the Box–Cox
procedure (Sakia, 1992) to search for a possible
power transform. The Box–Cox procedure suggested
a maximum likelihood estimate of λ=0, and as such a
natural log transform was performed on the outcome
vector. Reﬁtting the model on the transformed data
and inspecting the residual plots suggested that the
model assumptions were now satisfactorily met. We
also used a one-way ANOVA to compare discounting
behaviour between our groups. In line with our
speciﬁc hypothesis, we undertook a simple main ef-
fects post-hoc investigation of the signiﬁcant delayed re-
ward size×group interaction term from the full model
for large-sized rewards only (which were presented
with the furthest mean delays). We ﬁt a one-way
ANOVA model using diagnostic group as the single
between-subjects factor. The simple main effects F
ratio was computed using the estimated mean square
for the main effect of group from the one-way model
as the numerator, and the mean square of the error
from the original full GLM as the denominator (as
the best unbiased estimator of the residual error;
Langsrud, 2003). The p value was then computed
from the upper tail of the null F distribution with df
=2,79. We used the Tukey–Kramer pairwise compari-
son procedure for unequal group sizes (Hayter, 1984)
on signiﬁcant differences. We also investigated the re-
lationship between continuous clinical measures and
discounting rates by means of conducting correlational
analyses and used Bonferroni correction when report-
ing signiﬁcant correlations. The reward magnitude
and reward delay correlated signiﬁcantly (r=0.533,
p=0.004) in the monetary choice task (i.e. larger
rewards were associated with longer delays). To main-
tain consistency with the rest of the literature using the
same paradigm, we present the results with respect to
reward magnitude (i.e. large-sized rewards) instead of
reward delay.
Discount rate estimation procedure
Using the methodology suggested by Kirby et al.
(1999), a discounting coefﬁcient for each of the
monetary choices was established by using equation
(1). Calculation of an individual composite discounting
coefﬁcient for any given reward size uses ‘indifference
points’ at which participants cannot choose between
two monetary choices. For example, in a question
that asks participants to choose between ‘£14 today’
and ‘£25 in 19 days’, a participant with a discounting
rate higher than 0.041 would choose the immediate
monetary option. If the same participant chooses the
reward at a delay when they are asked to choose be-
tween ‘£15 today’ and ‘£35 in 13 days’, they would
have a discounting rate less than 0.10. The composite
discounting coefﬁcient for this participant for small-
sized rewards would be somewhere between these
two anchoring points and, following the recommenda-
tions of Kirby et al. (1999), is calculated by taking the
geometric mean of these two indifference points, there-
fore it would be 0.064.
When participants’ choices were not consistent
within a single value of the discounting coefﬁcient,
inconsistencies were resolved by taking the geometric
mean of all the indifference points within the streak
of inconsistent responses, as suggested by Kirby et al.
(1999).
Results
Participants and demographics
Table 2 displays basic demographic and clinical infor-
mation for all participants. The groups did not differ
signiﬁcantly in age and years of education but the cur-
rent MDD group had a signiﬁcantly higher number of
males. Healthy subjects and people with rMDD had
MADRS scores that were well below the cut-off for de-
pression (<10) (Hawley et al. 2002), but the remitted
MDD group showed slightly higher scores than con-
trols. Both of these groups had GAF scores indicating
minimal or absent symptoms (>80). Patients with cur-
rent MDD had signiﬁcantly higher MADRS and
lower GAF scores. All of the patients with current
MDD reported clinically signiﬁcant levels of anhedo-
nia based on the SCID assessment. Hopelessness scores
were based on the ninth item of the MADRS. It has
been suggested that this methodology is a clinically
valid approach in measuring the severity of individual
depressive symptoms (Desseilles et al. 2012). Currently
depressed patients had signiﬁcantly higher hopeless-
ness scores (see Table 2 for further results).
Discounting rates
We analysed the discounting task by ﬁtting a GLM in
which delayed reward size (small, medium, large) was
treated as a within-subjects factor and diagnostic
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group (control, rMDD, current MDD) was treated as a
between-subjects factor.
The results from the reﬁtted log-transformed model
suggest that there was a signiﬁcant reward size×
diagnostic group interaction (F4,158=3.968, p=0.004)
with a signiﬁcant Type III main effect of delayed re-
ward size (F2,158=53.146, p<0.001) but no signiﬁcant
Type III main effect of diagnostic group (F2,9=1.230,
p=0.298). The results of the simple main effects
analysis of the large rewards condition indicated a
signiﬁcant main effect of group (F2,79=8.955, p<0.01).
Post-hoc pairwise comparisons using the Tukey–
Kramer procedure with Studentized range critical
values (q<0.01 for df2,79 =4.24) suggested that patients
with MDD have signiﬁcantly higher discounting
rates relative to healthy subjects and remitted patients
[absolute difference>critical range: MDD>CON=
0.71>0.53; MDD>rMDD=0.57>0.53; both signiﬁcant at
p<0.01; healthy subjects and the remitted group were
not signiﬁcantly different (0.14<0.50)].
Finally, we computed one-sample t tests separately
in each group using a triangular area under the
curve (AUC) measurement [equation (3)] to investigate
whether the change in discounting rates from medium-
to large-sized rewards were signiﬁcant. The AUC
analysis helped us to conﬁrm that clinical group×
reward size interaction is inﬂuenced by abnormal
temporal discounting in current depression, whereby
depression selectively affects evaluation of medium-
(M) to large-sized (L) rewards over time.
AUC = [(μMk− μLk) × Y]/2, (3)
Table 1. Examples of monetary choices in the delay discounting taska (seven out of 27 time points)
Discount rate
ranking
Reward today
in GBP (V)
Future reward
in GBP (A)
Delay in
days (D)
Hyperbolic discount value
when indifferent [equation (2)]
Hyperbolic discount rate (k)
when indifferent [equation (1)]
1 11 30 7 0.090476 0.246753
2 15 35 13 0.043956 0.102564
3 27 50 21 0.021905 0.040564
4 40 55 62 0.004399 0.006048
5 49 60 89 0.002060 0.002522
6 67 75 119 0.000896 0.001003
7 78 80 162 0.000154 0.000158
a The selection was made so that both the delay in days and the future reward were sorted from the minimum to the
maximum value. Kirby et al. (1999) suggested using equation (1).
Table 2. Group comparison on demographic and basic clinical variables
Control (n=29) Remitted MDD (n=29) Current MDD (n=24) Test statistic p value
Age (years) 38±6.6 38.34±5.9 38.25±10.5 0.015a 0.985
Education (years) 17.3±2.8 17±3.1 16.2±3.5 0.901a 0.411
Gender, female 19 23 11 6.61b 0.037*
MADRS 2±2.7 3.9±3.4 33±4.3 52.193c 0.000*
MADRS-9 0.27±0.58 0.39±0.58 3.75±0.94 57.715c 0.000*
GAF 90±5.6 87.1±5.1 58.7±8.7 54.521c 0.000*
SOFAS – – 57.1±10.0 – –
MDD, Major depressive disorder; MADRS, Montgomery–Asberg Depression Rating Scale (MADRS-9 refers to hopelessness
scores); GAF, Global Assessment of Functioning; SOFAS, Social and Occupational Functionality Assessment Scale.
Values are given as number or mean±standard deviation.
a One-way ANOVA (df=2,79).
b Pearson’s χ2 (df=2).
c χ2 value in the Kruskal–Wallis test (df=2, showing asymptomatic signiﬁcance).
* Signiﬁcant at p40.05 threshold, two-tailed.
Patients with MDD had a signiﬁcantly higher number of males in the population, signiﬁcantly higher overall MADRS
scores and hopelessness scores, and signiﬁcantly lower GAF scores compared with the rest of the groups. Remitted MDD and
controls do not differ on any of the affective measures.
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where Y is a constant based on the difference between
mean large-sized rewards (£80) and mean medium-
sized rewards (£55); therefore 25. We used the mean
discounting rate for large-sized rewards (μLk) of each
group as the test value in their respective one-sample
t tests. The results showed that, in healthy subjects
(df=28, t=2.178, p<0.05) and remitted patients (df=
28, t=3.957, p<0.001), the change from medium- to
large-sized rewards is signiﬁcant whereas in patients
with current MDD, the change is non-signiﬁcant (df=
23, t=−1.030, p=0.314). The groups did not differ sign-
iﬁcantly in the amount of change in discounting rates
from medium- to large-sized rewards (F2,79 =1.569,
p=0.215). Taken together, these analyses suggest that
remitted patients and healthy subjects display compar-
able temporal discounting behaviour, whereas patients
with current depression have signiﬁcantly higher dis-
counting rates for large-sized rewards, which is mainly
inﬂuenced by the inability to evaluate medium- to
large-sized rewards differently over time, resulting in
a plateau of the discounting curve (Fig. 1).
Post-hoc correlation analyses
We investigated the relationship between depressive
symptoms, particularly hopelessness, and discounting
rates for large-sized rewards. Exploratory analyses
comprising all participants revealed that there was
a signiﬁcant correlation between MADRS and GAF
scores (Spearman’s rs =−0.777, p<0.001), and in the
pooled MDD sample (comprising patients with cur-
rent and remitted MDD; n=53) we observed this
relationship more strongly (Spearman’s rs =−0.855,
p<0.001). Our speciﬁc hypotheses concerned correla-
tions between discounting behaviour and (i) GAF
scores and (ii) hopelessness scores. As both of these
scores correlated with depression severity (MADRS),
we controlled for MADRS scores in these analyses.
In the pooled MDD sample, GAF scores (as an indi-
cator of general psychosocial functioning impairment)
and the discounting coefﬁcient for large-sized rewards
showed a signiﬁcant relationship (Pearson’s r=−0.308,
p<0.01), controlling for MADRS scores. Furthermore,
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Fig. 1. Graph showing mean discounting coefﬁcients (k) against monetary reward size using the raw data before natural log
transformation. Patients with major depressive disorder (MDD) had signiﬁcantly higher discounting rates for large-sized
rewards relative to healthy subjects and remitted patients with fully remitted MDD (rMDD) (** p<0.01 for both comparisons).
The scale bar shows±1 mean standard error (S.E.M.) across all reward sizes (=0.01); the S.E.M. for large-sized rewards is 0.008
(Control: 0.006, rMDD: 0.002, Current MDD: 0.015). The mean reward sizes for small-, medium- and large-sized rewards are
£30, £55 and £80, respectively.
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in the pooled MDD sample, discounting scores corre-
lated signiﬁcantly with hopelessness scores (Pearson’s
r=0.394, p<0.01), again controlling for MADRS; all
correlations survived Bonferroni correction.
Finally, to control whether our ﬁndings were driven
by medication effects or the gender distribution in the
MDD group, we compared patients with and without
medication and male patients with female patients.
There were no signiﬁcant differences for any of the
delayed reward sizes within the MDD group between
medicated and medication-free patients (t=−0.787,
df=22, p=0.440), and between male and female sub-
jects (t=0.051, df=22, p=0.960).
Discussion
The results of our study suggest that ﬁnancial decision
making in patients with MDD is associated with
shorter-term ﬁnancial reward preferences indicated
by higher discounting rates for large-sized rewards
relative to healthy subjects and remitted patients.
We found that differences in discounting rates across
reward sizes were modulated by clinical groups,
such that MDD patients, relative to both control and
rMDD groups, did not show a decrease in dis-
counting rates between medium and large rewards.
Higher discounting rates for large-sized rewards
seem to be associated with lower scores on a measure
of general psychosocial functioning (i.e. GAF) even
when controlling for depression severity (i.e. MADRS
scores). Furthermore, we have shown that discount-
ing rates for future rewards correlated signiﬁcantly
with the severity of hopelessness in the depression
group. Finally, we found that patients with fully
remitted symptoms did not differ signiﬁcantly from
healthy subjects in terms of temporal discounting
behaviour.
As expected, we have shown a signiﬁcant clinical
group by delayed reward size interaction, with no
signiﬁcant main effect of clinical diagnoses, consistent
across all delayed reward sizes. One-way ANOVA
conﬁrmed our a priori hypothesis that our groups
would be different in delay discounting coefﬁcients
for large-sized rewards. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons
revealed that patients with current MDD had signiﬁ-
cantly higher discounting rates relative to both healthy
subjects and remitted patients. Signiﬁcant correlations
between severity of hopelessness in the joint MDD
group and the discounting coefﬁcient for large-sized
rewards supported our prediction based on Beck’s cog-
nitive triad (Beck, 2005).
Previous studies have argued that individuals with
self-reported anhedonia demonstrated farsighted de-
cisions because present anhedonia blunts responses
to immediate rewards and these individuals would
imagine themselves enjoying monetary rewards more
in the distant future than in the present time
(Lempert & Pizzagalli, 2010). However, it is question-
able whether self-reported anhedonia in healthy sub-
jects is a reliable model for MDD. Beck’s cognitive
triad model argues that MDD is characterized by a
negative view of the future as well as the present. In
a forced choice paradigm, it may be that pessimism
about the future is a stronger inﬂuence on behaviour
than present anhedonia. Remission of future pessi-
mism and hopelessness may explain the absence of
signiﬁcant differences between the remitted group and
healthy subjects for large-sized rewards.
The present ﬁndings advance our understanding of
impairments in MDD associated with reward proces-
sing. Previous studies mainly considered impairments
contingent upon frequency and probability of winning
ﬁnancial rewards, but not how patients with MDD
subjectively evaluated their magnitudes over time
(Henriques et al. 1994; Pizzagalli et al. 2005, 2008). In
the current study we have shown that patients with
MDD were insensitive to the changes in the magnitude
of medium- to large-sized ﬁnancial rewards. We sug-
gest that this preference may be driven by the impact
of the time course rather than the changes in reward
magnitude alone. For example, when monetary
options in the monetary choice task are ranked from
lowest to highest with respect to their corresponding
k coefﬁcients, there is a 70% escalation from the lowest
medium-sized reward (£50) to the highest large-sized
reward (£85), whereas the delay escalation across
these monetary choices is approximately 303% (from
30 to 91 days). This means that the reward value per
unit of time dramatically decreases, and it is possible
that patients with MDD are more sensitive to these
changes. It has been argued that individuals with
impairments in time perception may have an altered
perception of distant reward magnitude based on a
higher cost per time unit (Wittmann & Paulus, 2008).
There is some evidence to suggest that patients with
MDD may have distorted time perception, experienc-
ing a slowing effect on time relative to healthy subjects
and patients with bipolar disorder (Bschor et al. 2004).
This could mean that patients with MDD perceive
delays as longer than they really are, thus devaluing
delayed rewards by associating a higher overall cost
for delays even if their cost per unit of delay is compar-
able to healthy subjects.
Paradoxically, impairments evaluating rewards over
time could enhance overall ﬁnancial performance in
the monetary choice task. For example, from an evol-
utionary ﬁnancial point of view, steeper discounting
behaviour in the monetary choice task, such as we
observed in patients with MDD, can lead to indivi-
duals banking larger amounts of money at any given
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point in time. An alternative explanation of our
ﬁndings is that patients with MDD may hold a more
realistic view of their prospects at any time point.
Depressive realism may be a mechanism by which
patients with MDD hold a more accurate estimation
of control over environmental contingencies and a
more accurate evaluation of uncertainties between
the present time and the future compared to healthy
subjects (Moore & Fresco, 2012). Such realism may
inﬂuence preferences for immediate rewards and con-
fer an advantage in some speciﬁc contexts. However,
the present task does not explicitly quantify such
uncertainties about the future; the hypothesis could
be tested explicitly by using an adaptation of the mon-
etary choice task to test whether lowering the prob-
ability of receiving the delayed reward results in
depressed patients outperforming controls.
Other studies have reported that patients with MDD
may outperform healthy subjects in certain socially
contingent decision-making paradigms, requiring
sacriﬁce of ﬁnancial rewards and investment of time
to reach an optimal solution to a problem (Harle
et al. 2010; von Helversen, 2011). Therefore, abnormali-
ties in rewarded decision making in MDD may be ad-
vantageous in some contexts but disadvantageous in
others, depending on speciﬁc task contingencies. This
may have implications for occupational performance
that warrant further exploration.
Our study had some limitations. First, the monetary
choice task was hypothetical in nature. However, it has
previously been shown that hypothetical monetary
proposals produce discounting behaviour that is simi-
lar to that obtained in studies using real currency
(Murphy et al. 2001). Second, in the present design,
the reward magnitude and the delays were correlated,
and therefore it is not possible to determine whether
the effects we show here are driven by reward magni-
tude or reward delay; future studies could address this
issue by having a design in which both factors vary
independently. Third, although we have shown that
temporal discounting for large-sized delayed rewards
was particularly inﬂuenced by severity of hopelessness
and overall impairments in psychosocial functioning,
we did not use an external measure of impulsivity to
rule out its possible confounding impact. However,
we consider that impulsivity should have limited inﬂu-
ence on delay discounting in MDD relative to addicted
clinical populations. Finally, about half of our MDD
group were currently medicated and therefore it is
possible that some of the effects were driven by medi-
cation. A post-hoc comparison between medicated and
unmedicated participants showed no signiﬁcant differ-
ence; however, this issue should be explored in future
studies with greater power to explore effects of medi-
cation (and other treatments).
Conclusions
We have shown that patients with MDD have signiﬁ-
cantly higher discounting rates for future rewards rela-
tive to both healthy subjects and remitted patients
whose discounting behaviour is comparable. Correla-
tions between clinical measures and the discounting
rates suggest that the differences between our groups
are driven by depressive symptomatology, especially
future directed pessimism. We have also shown that
patients with MDD are less sensitive to changes in
the reward size, as indicated by discounting rates
that plateau from middle- to large-sized rewards. We
suggest that the overall costs associated with long
delays may be driving steeper devaluation of the
magnitude of the reward.
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